Donald Trump’s Eastern European Approach: Talking Strong While Doing Little Is Not Effective
Returning in January, with Donald Trump’s election vows to end the war in Ukraine in under 24 hours” still fresh in memory, there was real concern in Moscow over Trump’s intentions. When Mr. Trump mused that “high levels of Tariffs, Tariffs, and Sanctions” on Russia might be required, one prominent pro-war Russian analyst remarked: “It’s better to get ready for the worst. Soon, we’ll reflect on the previous term with fondness, like a thaw.”
Empty Threats and Missed Opportunities
How wrong was that view? Since then, the US president has repeatedly spoken the talk without managing to following the walk. In May, when Vladimir Putin turned down a 30-day truce, and negotiation talks in Turkey went nowhere, a “bone-crushing US sanctions package did not to appear. An early August cut-off for Mr Putin to consent to a ceasefire somehow turned into a lavish welcome in Alaska, where Mr Trump applauded a figure sought for war crimes as he disembarked from his plane. The serious consequences” threatened by Mr Trump should the Alaska talks did not lead to peace never occur.
Encouraged Actions and Western Vulnerabilities
Empowered, Mr Putin has accordingly continued to prosecute his war aims in Ukraine, and test for western weaknesses. Last week’s intrusion of Russian drones into Polish territory exposed inadequate Nato planning, as F-35 and F-16 fighter jets were quickly scrambled to deal with low-cost suicide devices that are priced around $ten thousand each to produce. It also sent a message of possible escalation if any future “reassurance force” deploying European troops on Ukrainian soil. This kind of challenge called for a strong and unified response, applying the kind of pressure on the Kremlin which Mr Trump has to date refused to countenance. Instead the US president seems, yet again, to prefer pressuring his European allies to confronting Mr Putin. In a statement which reeked of bad faith, Mr Trump stated over the weekend that the US was “ready” to impose tougher sanctions on Russia, but only if certain unlikely conditions were met.
Impractical Demands and Economic Pressures
Aiming for a considerable economic gain, Washington is insisting that the EU must boost its imports of US liquified natural gas at a rate that analysts judge undoable. Other demands include the application by the EU of 50%-100% tariffs on Russia’s most important ally, China, and an end to all imports of Russian oil by Nato members. This includes Turkey, which has declined to sanction Moscow, imports 57% of its oil from Russia, and lies outside the EU.
Those looking on the bright side in Brussels believe that Mr Trump’s pressure may persuade Maga-friendly governments in Hungary and Slovakia to end their heavy dependence on Russian energy imports. That is highly unlikely to happen, as Mr Trump and his advisers must know. Nor can the EU afford to risk the kind of economic retaliation from Beijing that caused Mr Trump himself to back down from a full-blown trade war not long ago.
Concerning Events and Lack of Movement
During this week’s state visit, it will be Sir Keir Starmer’s turn to try to pin Mr Trump down on concrete action. But from the fruitless Alaska talks to his latest distracting tactics with the EU, Mr Trump keeps finding reasons not to get tough on Russia. Last week’s drone incursion in Poland represented an worrying raising of the ante. Ukraine’s prospects, and wider European security interests, are being gradually undermined by a president who, in this context, threatens but never acts.